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Abstract We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country 
hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the 
European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We generalize 
previous results analyzing a large number and different types of mega-events, 
evaluate the effects for winning and losing countries, investigate the determinants of 
the observed market reaction and control for the ex ante probability of a country 
being a successful bidder. Average abnormal returns measured at the announcement 
date and around the event are not significantly different from zero. Further, we find 
no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct 
benefits from the event, observe positive significant effects. Yet, when we control for 
anticipation, the stock price reactions around the announcements are  significant. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the announcement of large international 
sporting and cultural events on the stock markets of host countries. Such events, 
often known as mega-events, are one-time events that require very large 
expenditures, frequently funded by the host governments. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Why should we observe a market reaction to the announcement of such mega- 
events? Two main competing arguments predict that these events produce non- 
negative abnormal returns as of the announcement  date. 
The first argument predicts that stock market reaction reflects whether the event 
creates or destroys economic value for the listed firms in the host country. Under the 
null hypothesis of efficient markets, positive or negative abnormal returns would 
reflect the present value of the expected change in listed firms’ cash flows the event 
will produce. Assuming managers maximize shareholders’ value, only positive NPV 
projects would be undertaken, and market prices would adjust upwards the event- 
related news. Further, anticipation of (net) economy-wide benefits driven by event- 
related international exposure, public infrastructure improvements and multiplier 
effects of the initial revenues would result in a positive impact for the aggregate 
market. The market reaction on the day an event is announced may not accurately 
measure the true economic impact of the events if investors anticipate the event will 
occur (Malatesta and Thompson 1985). The magnitude of the effects observed is of 
smaller magnitude and, the greater the anticipation, the lower the price impact as of 
the announcement date. This is particularly true for the events we study because in 
most instances the outcome is at least partially anticipated by  investors. 
Market reaction to nomination news could reflect instead a national positive 
sentiment caused by pride, self-esteem or joy associated with the fact that the 
country was chosen to host and sometimes organize an international (most of the 
times) worldwide broadcasted and recognizably important event. 
The above arguments predict that winning (losing) countries observe positive 
(negative) market returns. Rational arguments predict that the effect should be 
asymmetric for winners and losers and across events, because the perceived 
economic impact can vary widely across countries. In a different way, behavioral 
arguments maintain that, if prices are affected by investor sentiment, regardless of 
the objective probability of observing the event and of the economic impact of the 
investment, we should observe a market rise in selected countries and a market 
decline in excluded countries. Further, the fact that investors extract more pain from 
bad news than the joy they sense when a good outcome is revealed can motivate 
different market reactions for winning and losing countries, and the magnitude of the 
effect would therefore be greater for losers than for  winners. 
If the event was not anticipated at all, i.e. event-news were a complete surprise, 
and investors are rational, the impact should be felt only on the winning bidder’s 
valuation. In reality this scenario is rather implausible: mega-events location 
decisions are complex ongoing processes that involve several rounds of negotiation 
and/or voting, and require active bidding and intense business plans preparation 
from the countries or cities that take part in the contest. Furthermore, when there is 
only one known candidacy, the announcement itself conveys no  news. 
Stock market impact is at most, an attenuated measure of overall net economic 
impact and we do not measure here the economy-wide benefits attributable to such 
events. Regardless of a positive or negative overall economic impact, individual 
stocks (and industry indices) may register positive abnormal returns. The same goes 
for the effects observed in aggregate market indices: even if investors are rational, an 
event yielding negative economy-wide effects does not necessarily have to have a 
similar correspondence in the stock market. Aggregate market returns are value- 
   
 
 
 
weighted averages of its individual constituent stocks’ returns and, while the event 
can be damaging for economic growth, some listed firms (and industries) that 
potentially extract direct benefits from the organization of the event, such as tourism 
and infrastructure-related industries, can observe positive market returns. Variation 
in abnormal returns across firms (or industries) would reflect the differential net 
benefit each firm (industry) extracts from the event. 
It is difficult to establish a priori the overall economic impact of the event and 
relate it directly to predict the sign and magnitude of market returns. Yet one can 
outline hypotheses motivated by the competing theoretical arguments, and test them 
upon the observed zero/non-zero, positive/negative abnormal returns, symmetrical/ 
asymmetrical effects for winning and losing countries and the cross-sectional 
variation of returns across events. 
In any case, whether selections to host mega-events are perceived or not as 
positive news to the firms more directly involved and to the economy of the host 
country is an interesting question. In fact, we observe that countries and cities 
strongly compete to host international sporting and cultural events, and provide 
public funding, on the basis of the positive effects on the country’s economy brought 
about by these events. Organizers claim that there are not only immediate increases 
in spending (direct and induced) but also further future economic benefits related 
with the infrastructure investments and international exposure. Yet there is a lot of 
controversy about the wealth effects of hosting these events. Several authors suggest 
that the actual impact may be substantially lower than the one estimated in ex ante 
models. In fact, ex post studies highlight that not only are the direct benefits lower 
(because of improper measurement of benefits and costs), but also that there is lack 
of empirical evidence demonstrating that the international exposure and the publicity 
associated with the event have any impact in improving the country or region for 
tourism or business. As for the companies more directly involved, previous literature 
suggests that stock prices tend to respond favorably to announcements of similar 
large capital investments. 
We study stock price reaction around the announcement of the selected country to 
host the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European 
Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We also measure the market 
effects of the announcement of the nomination of the European Cultural  City. 
First, we evaluate the abnormal returns of winning bidders on (and around) the 
announcement date using an event study approach. We study the impact at market 
and industry-levels. Second, we analyze the determinants of the variation in 
abnormal returns across events and industries on the basis of a set of variables found 
important by previous studies and control for the prior probability of observing the 
event. Third, on the basis of a simple model of partial anticipation, we reexamine the 
abnormal returns observed for winning and losing countries and perform a series of 
tests to disentangle the different theoretical arguments that could account for the 
observed stock market behavior. 
Using a cross-section of 81 winning countries, we find that, on average there is no 
significant stock price reaction upon the announcements. We also measure stock 
price reaction over several other event-windows and again results are inconclusive. 
Further, the stock price reaction for losers is not statistically significant. Furthermore, 
we find no evidence supporting that industries likely to benefit from the selection 
 
 
 
  
observe stronger effects. Overall, non parametric tests seem to be more powerful but 
results are mixed. The results of the cross-sectional analysis confirm some of the 
relations we predict. In particular, we report that abnormal returns are lower (in 
absolute terms) for winners and losers when the outcome is predictable. Overall we 
interpret our findings as supportive of rational valuation and partial anticipation. The 
results suggest further that non-trivial benefits exist but these are specific to 
particular events and countries. Thus, no general statement can be made regarding 
the economic merit of hosting a  mega-event. 
This study is related with several strands of the finance and economic literature. 
We focus on the literature of information and market efficiency. Another strand of 
literature directly related to this paper is the impact of sentiment on asset prices that 
we indirectly address. Our results are also of interest to other empirical economic 
research areas such as economic impact studies of large capital investments and 
public investment in infrastructures, and sports, recreation and tourism  studies. 
Our main contribution is to perform rigorous study of market reaction to the 
announcement of mega-events. Previous studies focus on one particular event and 
consequently do not have the opportunity to explore the cross-sectional variation in 
abnormal returns. Because we analyze a large number of events, we improve 
statistical significance and are able to explore the determinants of cross-sectional 
variation across events. In addition we study different types of events that can be 
grouped in two major classes, sporting and cultural events. On top of that, unlike 
most of the previous studies, we control for partial anticipation and evaluate the 
effects for winning and losing countries. Our study generalizes previous results, 
investigates the determinants of the observed market impact and controls for the ex 
ante probability of a country being a successful  bidder. 
While we do not address directly the overall economic benefits of these events, it 
is possible to draw some policy implications regarding the merit of (funding) these 
events. Given the limitations of traditional economic impact ex ante studies (and 
because the implementation of more comprehensive and rigorous techniques may be, 
in most cases, impracticable), event-studies can inform policy makers about the 
wealth effects of the organization of mega events. 
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
related literature. Section 3 presents the testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data 
and tests. In Section 5 we present and discuss our main findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Background and previous findings 
 
2.1 Overall economic impact of mega-events 
 
Dwyer et al. (2005) refer to mega-events as one-time or recurring events of limited 
duration. Mega-event projects entail large construction projects (infrastructural, 
productive  or not)  and  operational  costs.
1  
Economic impact  studies (or economic 
 
 
1 For example, Germany spent over 1,4 billion euros building or rehabilitating 12 stadiums for the 2006 
Soccer World Cup of which 35% were funded by taxes and Greece spent over 1 billion euros in the 2004 
Olympic Summer Games on security (cited by Matheson 2006). 
   
 
 
 
impact assessments), most of the times sponsored by promoters, claim these mega 
projects are very positive NPV projects and there seems to be a lot of interest in 
hosting these events. Yet several studies suggest that not only are  the  input 
estimates optimistic but the typical methodology to assess ex ante event-related 
economic returns, input-output models, fail to correctly account for the revenues 
that are attributable to the event.
2 
To properly assess how much growth  is 
attributable to the event, one has to a) control for “substitution” and “crowding- 
out” effects; b) incorporate multipliers that reflect eventual “leakages to other 
countries”3; and c) account for the impact in taxation or government borrowing.4 
More refined models propose using a series of relevant variables, proxy factors for 
local growth determinants, to project the level of economic activity in the  absence 
of the event. Comparing this estimate with the actual level of activity will tell us ex 
post what the effective contribution of the event was. In other words, deviations 
from average national (or local) growth or historical growth, that are not explained 
by deviations in costs of production or demand side variables, should be attributed 
to the event. 
There is some controversy regarding the economy-wide impact of mega-events in 
the host countries. The impact is measured frequently by changes in personal 
income, per capita personal income, employment or sale taxes collections. 
Academic studies that analyze the ex post effects of these mega-events confirm 
that ex ante estimates are overly optimistic. For example, Baade and Matheson 
(2004) present an ex post analysis of the 1994 World Cup in the U.S. and find that 
several cities did in fact experience significant losses in contrast with the gains 
estimated by the tournament promoters.
5 
The most recent and sophisticated ex post 
studies, seem to suggest no consistent positive statistically significant net economic 
benefits (Matheson 2006).
6 
In any case, several authors notice that it is difficult to 
isolate the impact of the event and given that it is probably small relative to the 
overall economy, one may not be able reject the null of no economic benefits even if 
true benefits occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Dwyer et al. (2005) propose a more comprehensive computable generating equilibrium model (CGE) to 
assess the economic impact of such events. 
3  The benefits may not go all to the host country but to foreign neighbor countries or multinationals.  For 
example, the 16 official partners for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany were multinationals and only 
two were German. Yet all the official suppliers were German  companies. 
4  Public funding is often required for the event infrastructures. This could imply that other potential more 
productive investments are not funded (or postponed) or that taxes have to rise (Siegfried and Zimbalist 
2000). Those public expenditures may or not have positive impact on the economy. Sporting events 
specialized infrastructures such as stadiums or swimming pools have a limited use and potentially benefit 
only a small part of the tax payers that paid for it. More general construction projects such as cities core 
redevelopment and infrastructure building may benefit more directly the country or local community. 
Similarly, the benefits from investing in cultural or lifestyle amenities can attract highly educated and 
creative young people that are essential to economic growth. 
5  The authors suggest that host cities accumulated losses of US$ 5.5 to US$9.3 billion as opposed to   the 
US$4 billion gain estimated by the organizers. 
6 Please refer to Matheson (2006) for an extensive survey of ex ante and ex post economic impact studies 
(Tables 1 and 2). 
  
 
 
 
2.2 Market impact of investment decisions 
 
The extensive event study literature focusing on announcement effects provides 
evidence that, on average, stock price reaction is consistent with market efficiency: 
prices rapidly and fully adjust to the release of new corporate   information.
7
 
 
2.2.1 Market reaction to major capital investments 
 
Capital expenditures decisions are the key financial decisions in terms of 
contribution to firm-value (Miller and Modigliani 1958). 
Under the null hypothesis of efficient markets, the announcement effects on 
market prices should reflect the significance of any unexpected news that influence 
cash flows or discount rates (McQueen and Roley 1993). Stock prices at time t are 
given by: 
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where Dt+τ are the expected dividends at time t  + τ; tRt+τ is the expected discount 
rate at time t  + τ; and E[./Ωt] are the conditional expectations upon the available 
information set Ω at time t. 
There are alternative stock price reactions to announcements of capital 
expenditures plans (Woolridge and Snow 1990; Burton et al.  1999): 
– a positive market reaction reflects that managers maximize shareholder wealth 
and undertake positive-NPV projects; hence, the larger the economic valued 
added by these projects, the larger the positive impact. If we assume rational 
expectations and random economic news, a positive market reaction reflects that 
investors are positively surprised by the unexpected news; 
– a zero market reaction to the announcement could reflect investors have perfect 
foresight and fully anticipate the effects and timing of future positive NPV 
projects. The market value of a company would reflect in advance the effects of 
these or other investments that the firm would have to pursue to maintain its 
(anticipated) competitive advantages. Therefore, the market reaction to the 
announcement does provide a proper measure of the economic merit of hosting 
a mega-event; 
– finally, a negative market reaction could either reflect that investors view these 
projects as “empire-building” decisions, or that investors are myopic, i.e., they 
pay too much attention to short-term earnings and penalize long-term capital 
investments. 
Previous empirical literature finds that, on average, stock prices seem to respond 
favorably to announcements of individual firms major capital investments.
8   
Further 
 
 
7 For thorough reviews, see, for example, Fama (1991) and Dimson and Mussavian (1998). Several recent 
studies present evidence contrary to market efficiency suggesting either overshooting in prices or gradual 
information dissemination (see for example, Fama 1998). 
8 See,  for  example,  Woolridge  and  Snow  (1990),  Jones  et  al.  (2004)  and  Titman  et  al.  (2004) and 
references therein. 
   
 
 
 
the stock price reaction is greater, the level of new investments announced. 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) show that firms’ stock market responses to capital 
expenditures announcements reflect their investment opportunities. Similarly, Blose 
and Shieh (1997) show the market response is larger to announcements of firms with 
good investment opportunities. Yet Titman et al. (2004) show that the increased 
investment expenditures may be associated with negative stock returns when 
investors believe that managers invest in negative NPV projects for their own 
benefits.
9
 
 
2.2.2 Partially-anticipated events 
 
Stock price changes on the announcement date only reflect a part of the overall 
economic effect of an event when investors partially anticipate the event. Market 
reaction to announcements depends on investors’ perception of the likelihood of the 
event. The announcement effect is most of the times smaller than the economic 
impact of the event and failure to find significant announcement returns may be 
explained by partial anticipation. Stock prices may as well reflect investor 
disappointment if investors had prior expectations on the occurrence of events with 
positive value than do not materialize (Malatesta and Thompson 1985). Several 
studies have estimated the likelihood of observing an event based upon firms 
characteristics and found that the extent of market reaction is affected by investors’ 
prior expectations.
10
 
 
2.2.3 Mega-events 
 
Mega-events announcements may produce a short-term impact on the stock prices of 
the listed companies that benefit directly from the event such as construction and 
building materials, tourism-related, communications and media companies. More 
long-term effects could also arise due to general multiplier effects and, even more 
important, as a result of country projection. Merton (1987) refers to changes in 
investor recognition as a source of value. Investors only invest in the assets of which 
they are aware and require higher returns to compensate for the shadow cost of 
incomplete information. Organizing a large event such as the Olympic games can 
overrun that cost and, through an expansion of shareholders’ base, lead to a decrease 
in required returns translating into higher stock market valuations. The increased 
exposure to international media may also produce long-term benefits through 
increased tourism receipts in the years after the  event. 
Veraros et al. (2004) examine the effect of the announcement of the hosting city 
for the 2004 Olympic games on the stock exchanges of Greece and Italy and find   a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Related with this is what is sometimes designated by Capital Myopia that refers to excessive investments 
pursued by companies that erroneously believe that there is scope for further profitable capital investments 
ignoring that competition will drive away economic rents. 
10  See, for example, Acharya (1993) or Akhigbe et al. (2004) and the references   therein. 
  
 
 
 
significant positive effect on the Athens Stock Exchange.
11 
Yet no (negative) effect 
is observed for the losing country (Milan Stock  Exchange). 
 
2.2.4 Investor sentiment 
 
Several authors show that changes in investor mood are associated with changes in 
market prices. Thus, prices could move regardless of the true economic impact of the 
events or the degree of anticipation associated. Recent literature shows that events 
that have a general impact on investor sentiment, such as national team soccer 
results, produce statistically and economically significant returns. For example, 
Edmans et al. (2007) find that a loss in World Cup leads to a next-day abnormal 
return of negative 38 basis points, and claim that this loss effect is driven by investor 
sentiment. 
 
 
3 Development of hypotheses 
 
We  evaluate the following hypotheses: 
(i) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Football 
Cup, the European Football Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a 
positive market reaction in the selected country stock exchange.
12
 
A significant positive average market reaction in the selected country is consistent 
with shareholder value maximization reflecting that investors believe that hosting a 
mega-event creates value for listed firms. The announcement conveys good news 
and market reaction reflects the change in value attributed to uncertainty resolution. 
A null market reaction could reflect that the perceived net benefits for the listed 
firms are trivial, or that investors have perfectly anticipated the timing and effects of 
the event. A negative market reaction for the winning country could reflect either 
that investors’ believe that hosting is a value-destroying event or that investors are 
myopic. 
(ii) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Soccer 
Cup, the European Soccer Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a 
negative market reaction on the losing country stock exchange. 
A significant negative market reaction for the losing country is consistent with 
shareholder value maximization under the assumptions that investors view “hosting” 
as a value-creating event and do not have a perfect  foresight. 
(iii) Individual industries that potentially benefit more from the event exhibit 
higher market reaction. 
 
 
 
11 A similar study conducted by Berman et al. (2000) found no significance effect on the overall market, 
and only limited effects on stock prices of infrastructure development companies based in New South 
Wales where the Olympic Games were hosted. 
12  The statistical null hypothesis tested in Section 5 is that the impact of the announcement of the event is 
null and so forth for the other  hypotheses. 
   
 
 
 
The positive/negative effects can be asymmetric reflecting that there are 
differential net potential benefits for the economies of the winning/losing 
countries.
13 
A similar price impact across industries, regardless of the potential 
economic benefits they can extract from the event, is consistent with investor 
sentiment. 
(iv) Abnormal returns (for the winning countries) vary across events and industries 
and are driven by the relative importance of the event (relative to the 
underlying economy), the time-span between the announcement and the 
realization of the event, and the degree of partial anticipation. 
Significant differences in the cross-section of abnormal returns are evidence in 
favor of arguments that predict that the observed effects are associated with 
differential benefits across countries and industries. 
 
 
4 Data and tests 
 
4.1 Data 
 
Announcement dates were gathered from several sources (through mail contact or 
websites): IOC (International Olympic Committee) for the Summer and Winter 
Olympic Games; FIFA (Fedération Internationale de Football Association) for the 
World Football Cups; UEFA (Union des Associations Européennes de Football) for 
the European Football Cups; Bureau International des Expositions for the World and 
Specialized Exhibitions; and the EC (European Commission) for the European 
Capitals of Culture. Announcement dates are available upon  request. 
The sampling criterion was availability of daily country and industry indices 
returns with at least half a year before the event. The final sample consists of 81 
announcements.
14 
The first announcement date is May 16, 1955 and refers to the 
1960 Summer Olympic Games hosted by Italy. The last announcement date in our 
sample is July 2, 2003 and refers to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games that will be 
hosted by Canada. The average lag between the announcement and the realization of 
the mega-events for the 81 events is 57.5  months. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the events analyzed by type of event and by 
organizing country.
15 
Our sample includes six Summer Olympic Games (1984 
onwards), eight Winter Olympic Games (1988 onwards), six World Football Cups 
(1990 onwards), ten European Football Cups (1984 onwards), 11 World Exhibitions 
(1982  onwards),  ten  Specialized  World  Exhibitions  (1980  onwards)  and       30 
 
 
 
13 In alternative, positive or negative market reactions, respectively for the winning or losing countries 
could reflect investor sentiment. A stronger (negative) effect for losing countries is consistent with 
behavioral arguments. 
14 Some  events  are  co-organized  by  two  or  more  countries. For  example, Belgium  and  Netherlands 
organized the 2000 European Football Cup together. In that case we consider them as separate 
observations. 
15 There are a few cases for which there is no market information for the winning country when the 
nomination was announced. For example, this is true for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in the former 
Soviet-Union or the 1988 Winter Olympic Games in  Korea. 
  
 
 
 
Table 1  Events analyzed: hosting country and type of event 
 
 
Hosting country/ Summer Winter World European World World European 
Type of event olympic olympic football football exhibitions specialized capitals of 
games games cups cups exhibitions culture 
(81) (6) (8) (6) (10) (11) (10) (30) 
 
 
EUROPE (58) 
Germany (8) 2006 1988 2000 1983/ 
1993/2003 
 
 
1988/1999 
Austria (2) 2008 2003 
Belgian (3) 2000 2000/2002 
Denmark (1) 1996 
Spain (5) 1992 1992 1992/2000/ 
2002 
Finland (1) 2000 
France (7) 1992 1998 1984 1989/1993/ 
2000/2004 
Greece (3) 2004 1997/2006 
Netherlands (5) 2000 1982/2002   1987/2001 
Ireland (2) 1991/2005 
Italy (7) 2006 1990 1980 1992 1986/2000/ 
2004 
Norway (2) 1994 2000 
Poland (1) 2000 
Portugal (3) 2004 1998 2001 
United Kingdom (4) 1996 1984 1990/2008 
Czech Republic (1) 2000 
Sweden (2) 1992 1998 
Switzerland (1) 2008 
NORTH AMERICA (11) 
 
Canada (4)  1988/2010  1986 1980 
USA (7) 1984/1996 1980/2002 1994 1982/1984  
ASIA (10)      
Japan (5)  1998 2002 1985/2005 1990 
South Korea (2)   2002 1993  
China (3) 2008   2010 1999 
OCEANY (2) 
Australia (2) 2000 1988 
 
 
(number of events organized in parentheses) 
 
European Capitals of Culture (1986 onwards). Even after excluding the European 
Capitals of Culture, Europe has been the most successful venue attracting these 
events. Worldwide, by country, the US is the top organizer followed by Japan, 
Canada, Germany and Italy. Table 10 in “Appendix” shows descriptive statistics 
regarding the relative magnitude of the events analyzed. Mega-event investments 
vary depending on the type the event. The Summer Olympic Games and the   World 
   
 
 
 
Football Cups are the largest events with total investment of over 10% the host 
country GNP. 
We also gathered information for the losing candidacies when available. This 
information, shown in Table 2, was only available for a subset of events and dates.
16 
The most active (not successful) bidder is Canada followed by  Sweden. 
Returns for the winning and losing countries were obtained from Datastream and 
computed using a total return index measured in US   dollars.
17
 
For the multiple analysis we use GDP and industrial production index data from 
IMF. Market capitalization data were obtained from Datastream. The Olympic 
Games voting results for the several rounds were obtained from Lyberg, Wolf 
“Fabulous 100 years of the IOC; facts, figures and much, much more”, Lausanne 
1996, pp. 308–313 and from the IOC website. The World Football Cup voting 
results were provided by FIFA. Table 3 shows the votes gathered by the winning and 
the losing countries for the several rounds of  voting. 
 
4.2 Tests 
 
4.2.1 Abnormal returns 
 
To measure the magnitude of stock price reactions to announcements we use the standard 
abnormal returns technique based upon the several benchmarks described below. 
We examine the effects of the nomination news on returns as of the 
announcement date. We analyze several other windows to account for partial 
anticipation and leakages in information or delayed effects due to thin  trading. 
Daily abnormal returns were calculated using constant-mean, market-adjusted 
and risk-adjusted methods described in Brown and Warner (1985).
18 
The date of the 
announcement is designated as day t = 0. Daily returns are collected for the   period 
(t = −140 to 20). The estimation and event periods were defined respectively as 
[−140, −21] and [−20,  20]. 
Abnormal returns, ARit, are obtained as the difference between observed (log) 
returns of the country i at event day t, Rit, and the expected return generated by a 
chosen benchmark Ε(Rit). Ε(Rit) is defined as follows, respectively for the constant- 
mean return, the market-adjusted and the risk-adjusted methods: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
16 Stock market information was not available for several losing countries by the time of the nomination 
announcement (for example, China, in respect to the 2000 Summer Olympic Games or Morocco, in 
respect to the 1998 and 2002 World Football  Cups). 
17 Datastream indices were preferred over other domestic market and industry indices when available 
because they are constructed on a uniform basis across markets and are not backfilled with firms added or 
deleted from the index. The exception was the total return series for Spain general index (IBEX) obtained 
directly from Bolsa de Madrid. 
18 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that the tests are not highly sensitive to the benchmark model of 
abnormal returns. Market-adjusted returns are not included here for all tests. Results are available upon 
request. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2 Events analyzed: losing candidacies 
 
 
Losing country/ 
type of event 
Summer olympic 
games 
Winter olympic 
games 
World football 
cup 
World 
exhibitions 
(13) (13) (2) (6) 
 
 
EUROPE (19) 
Germany (1) 2000 
Austria (1) 2010 
France (2) 1992/2008 
Greece (1) 1996 
Italy (2) 2004 1988 
Norway (1) 1992 
United Kingdom (2)  2000 2006 
Russia (1) 2010 
Sweden (5) 2004 1992/1994/1998/ 
2002 
Switzerland (2) 2002/2006 
Turkey (1) 2008 
NORTH AMERICA (9) 
 
Canada (6) 1996/2008 2002  1998/2000/2005 
USA (2)  1994/1998   
Mexico (1)    2010 
ASIA (3)     
Japan (1) 1988    
South Korea (2) 
AFRICA (2) 
 2010  2010 
South Africa (2) 2004  2006  
OCEANY (1)     
Australia (1) 1996    
(number of bids in parentheses) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
The presence of unequal integration of the countries analyzed makes it difficult to 
find a good model for the pricing of these securities. We assume that the degree of 
integration is fixed through the period of estimation of risk exposures and that 
markets are fully integrated with the world market. We thus use an unconditional 
world market model. Parameters a and b were estimated regressing market index 
returns on the world market index (Rm) over the estimation   period. 
   
 
 
 
Table 3  Events analyzed: voting results for the winning and losing countries over the several rounds 
 
 
Event Host Country Ranking Bid in previous 
event? 
1st 
Round 
2nd 
Round 
3rd 
Round 
4th 
Round 
5th 
Round 
Always 
leading? 
 
 
Panel A. Winning Countries 
Summer Olympic Games 
1984 USA single candidacy Yes No 
 
1992 Spain first first first   Yes No 
1996 USA second third first first first No No 
2000 Australia second second second first  No Yes 
2004 Greece second first first first  No Yes 
2008 China first first    Yes No 
Winter Olympic Games 
1980 USA single candidacy Yes No 
 
1988 Canada first first    Yes No 
1992 France second first first first first Yes No 
1994 Norway first second first   No Yes 
1998 Japan first first first first  No No 
2002 USA first     Yes Yes 
2006 Italy first     Yes No 
2010 Canada second first    Yes No 
World Exhibitions 
1998 Portugal first     Yes No 
2000 Germany first     Yes No 
2005 Japan first     Yes No 
2010 China first first first first  Yes No 
World Football Cups 
1990 Italy first    Yes No 
1994 USA first    Yes No 
1998 France first    Yes No 
2002 Japan single candidacy    Yes No 
2002 S. Korea single candidacy    Yes No 
2006 Germany first second first   No No 
Panel B. Losing Countries 
Summer Olympic Games 
 
1988 Japan second     no no 
1992 France first second second   no no 
1996 Greece first first First second second yes no 
2004 Italy second second second second  no no 
2008 Canada second second    no no 
Winter Olympic Games 
1994 Sweden third first second   yes yes 
1998 USA fourth second second second  yes no 
  
 
 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
 
Event Host Country Ranking      Bid in previous 
event? 
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Always  
  Round Round Round Round Round leading?  
2002 Switzerland second     no no 
2006 Switzerland second     no yes 
2010 Korea first second    no no 
World Exhibitions 
1998 Canada second     no no 
2000 Canada second     no yes 
2005 Canada second     no yes 
2010 Korea second second second second  no no 
World Football Cups 
2006 South Africa second   second  second no no 
 
 
 
 
Averaging abnormal returns across markets in common event time, we obtain the 
average cross-sectional abnormal return given by: 
 
 
  
where N is the number of countries in the  sample. 
By cumulating the average residuals over a particular time interval (−20 < t1<=0; 
0=<t2<20), we obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) as 
follows
19
: 
 
  
The procedure is similar when we analyze the effects for a particular industry. CARs 
are computed first averaging daily abnormal industry returns across markets and then 
cumulating industry average abnormal returns over the days that comprise the event 
window under scrutiny.
20 
To compute industry returns we use the 32 Datastream 
industry-level four index series. 
We use both parametric and non-parametric tests to assess the statistical 
significance of average abnormal returns. The use of several tests aims at ensuring 
the robustness of results when the usual assumptions of independence in the   cross- 
 
 
 
 
19 Because we use continuously compounded returns, buy and hold returns for a specific time-span are 
achieved simply summing the log returns. If we assume that discrete returns are distributed as iid log 
normal variables, cumulative log returns are normal distributed. 
20  The benchmark to compute industry market- and risk-adjusted abnormal returns was the country’s total 
return market index. 
   
 
 
 
section, constant variance or normality of returns are incorrect.
21 
The parametric test 
statistics examined are Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) with and without crude 
dependence adjustment, the standardized residual test and Boehmer et al. (1991) 
standardized cross-sectional test. The non-parametric statistics are the sign test, 
Corrado (1989)’s rank test and Wilcoxon-signed rank  test.22 
 
4.2.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
To estimate the impact of the determinants on the cross-sectional variation of 
abnormal returns, we estimate the following equation using fixed effects for 
industries
23
: 
 
  
 
where CARjs are the cumulative abnormal returns for industry s (in host country j); 
SIZEj is the ratio between the event capital expenditure and the host country j GDP; 
LAGj is the time lag between the announcement and the moment of the event hosted 
by country j; LIQj is the ratio between country j market capitalization and its GDP; 
RECj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at the time of the event 
hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; EXPj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy 
is in expansion at the time of the event hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; REPjs is 
the ratio of industry s market capitalization and the overall market capitalization of 
country j; VOTj is the difference in the percentage of votes between winning country 
j and the losing country with the largest number of votes in the last round; Dk are 
dummies for each type of event (Olympic Games, etc.); and ηjs is an i.i.d. error term. 
Our main variable of interest is VOT. We expect that the smaller the difference 
in the percentage of votes between the two candidates in the last round, the larger 
the surprise in the announcement news and therefore the larger  the  impact on 
prices. 
We control for a set of other variables found important by previous studies. The 
variable SIZE is motivated by Burton et al. (1999) that report that the market impact 
of capital expenditures announcements is stronger for larger projects. Yet, the 
findings of Woolridge and Snow (1990) do not confirm this relation. Given that we 
are comparing countries with very different economy sizes we use relative instead of 
 
 
 
 
21 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that with short horizons, the usual test statistic is not highly sensitive 
to assumptions about the cross-sectional or times-series dependence or normality of returns. Further, they 
show that short horizon event study tests are generally well-specified but the power of the tests is sensitive 
to sample size and firm characteristics (such as volatility). For firms with low volatility, sample size of 20 
is enough attain full power for a 1% abnormal  return. 
22 The tables below report the statistics for the usual Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) parametric tests and 
for the sign test. Other results are available upon  request. 
23 We run the same regression for market CARs (instead of industry CARs) using OLS (instead of fixed 
effects) without the industry-specific variable REP. 
  
 
 
 
absolute size.
24 
The variable LAG proxies investors’ myopia. Burton et al. (1999) 
and Woolridge and Snow (1990) fail to find any significant different effect in market 
reaction between long-term and short-term project announcements. LIQ tries to 
capture how well the economic output of a particular country is mirrored in its stock 
market. REP is an industry-specific variable to control for the importance of a 
particular industry in the stock market. To accommodate the findings of McQueen 
and Roley (1993) that report a negative relation between market impact and 
economic activity, we also include the variables REC and EXP. These variables 
proxy economy-wide activity. We follow McQueen and Roley (1993) methodology 
to define economic states. Finally, we include dummies for the type of event and 
allow for industry fixed effects to account for differential benefits across  industries. 
 
4.2.3 Partially anticipated effects 
 
We  analyze two specifications to evaluate the role of partial  anticipation. 
 
Partial anticipation I On the basis of the model derived in “Appendix”, we propose 
the following empirical testable model: 
 
  
where CARi are the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window for country i 
aggregate market index; (i = winners, losers); pi is defined as the probability of 
country i hosting the event; Di is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country i is 
nominated and 0 otherwise; and μi  is a i.i.d. error  term. 
To estimate α, cp and δ we pool the cumulative abnormal returns of the winning 
and losing countries across events. 
If the country is chosen to host (or not host) the event, expected abnormal returns 
are given by, respectively: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the expressions (A-4) and (A-5) in  “Appendix” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Veraros et al. (2004) argue that the difference in the reaction of Athens and Milan stock exchanges 
could result from economy size differences (Greece and Italy) and the importance of the two cities 
potentially hosting the event (Athens and Rome). 
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where Vj−1 and Vl−1 denote, respectively, the winning country j and the losing 
country l market valuation just before the event is announced; NPVj and NPVl stand 
for the economic impact of the event for each  country. 
Rational   arguments   yield   the   following   predictions:α =0,   cp <0   and   δ >0. 
Assuming that the effects observed reflect solely the economic impact of the event 
(i.e., α=0), δ and cp will capture all the relevant effects. cp pl  reflects that stock prices 
will  adjust  downwards  for  the  losing  country  in  the  anticipated  effect  (that  the 
country  would  win).  cppj   +  δ  reflects  the  upwards  adjustment  in  stock  prices  for 
the winning country in the unanticipated effect (that the country would win). If the 
economic impact of the event was similar for the two countries (in percentage of its 
actual  market  capitalization),  δ  would  capture  the  total  economic  impact  of  the 
project. Ceteris paribus, the greater the economic effect of the project, the larger the 
magnitude  of  the  parameters,  δ and  cp.  When  the  event  is  not  anticipated  at  all,  δ 
captures  the  full  economic  impact  for  the  winning  country  (E(CARj)  =  δ  and 
E(CARl) = 0).
25
 
 
Partial anticipation II To account for market expectations in (8), we use the 
percentage of votes received by the country in the last round.
26 
This may be 
considered an objective prior probability assuming rational expectations. Yet, the 
selection process is highly competitive and, in the successive rounds of voting, the 
ranking is often reversed, and front runners are many times overtaken by other 
candidates. One could argue that initial and intermediate rankings also influence 
investors’ expectations. To account for that, we tested the following alternative 
specification: 
  
where CARi and Di are defined as in (8); (i = winners, losers); PSi is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial surprise and 0 
 
 
25 If stock prices are influenced by sentiment, δ reflects the effect of positive sentiment while α captures 
the negative sentiment in prices. Further, if sentiment effects are more pronounced for losing countries, 
|α| > |δ|. Finally, cp=0, reflecting that prices are affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the objective 
probability of observing the event. 
26 Very  recently, online sports and non-sports exchanges, initiated trading on contracts where account 
holders may buy or sell the future outcome of various events. Intrade.com, for example, allows to trade 
contracts that bet on the venue (region) that will host the Summer  Olympics. 
  
 
 
otherwise; TSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are 
an almost total surprise and 0 otherwise; andωi  is an i.i.d. error  term. 
The specification (13) accommodates the fact that investors form their expect- 
ations on the basis of all rounds of voting. Further we also take into account the 
country bidding record. The motivation for including this piece of information is 
grounded on the idea that the selection outcome is influenced by the lobbying power 
of the candidacies (Veraros et al. 2004): if the country did bid for hosting the last 
event and lost, investors may perceive that the lobbying power is limited and 
anticipate that, once again the candidacy will not  succeed. 
We classify the announcement news as total surprises, out of line to market 
expectations, when: 
– for the winning country, the country did not consistently lead the ranking in the 
previous voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; 
– for the losing country, the country lead the ranking in some of the previous 
voting rounds, and had not bid for hosting the previous event. 
Announcement news are classified as partial surprises  when: 
– for the winning country, the country consistently lead the ranking in all the 
previous voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; or the 
country did not lead the ranking in all previous voting rounds but had not bid for 
hosting the previous event. 
– for the losing country, the country never lead the ranking in the successive 
voting rounds, but had not bid for hosting the previous event; or the country lead 
the ranking in only one of the previous voting rounds but had bid for hosting the 
previous event. 
Expected abnormal returns for the winning and losing bidders for the cases of 
total surprise and partial surprise can be summarized as  follows: 
 
Surprise/Country 
No Surprise 
Winning 
’0+10 
Losing 
’0 
Partial Surprise 
Total Surprise 
ϕ0  þ ϕ1  þ l0  þ l1 
ϕ0  þ ϕ2  þ l0  þ l2 
’0 +’1 
’0 +’2 
Rational arguments yield the following predictions. For the winning country φ0 þ 
l0 ¼ 0; φ0 þ φ1 þ l0  þ l1  > 0; φ0  þ φ2  þ l0  þ l2  > 0;  and  φ0  þ φ2  þ l0  þ l2 
> φ0 þ φ1 þ l0 þ l1 . As for the losing country, the predictions are φ0 ¼ 0; φ0 þ 
φ1 < 0; φ0 þ φ2 < 0; and jφ0 þ φ2j > jφ0 þ φ1j. If there is no surprise, abnormal 
returns as of the announcement date should be null. The greater the surprise, the 
greater the positive (negative) impact of the nomination news for the winning (losing) 
country.
27
 
 
 
 
 
27 If prices are affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the objective probability of observing the 
event, the behavioral effect is subsumed by parameters ϕ0 and λ0.ϕ0 +λ0 >0; ϕ0 <0; and—ϕ0 >λ0/2 
(asymmetrical  effect). 
   
 
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Abnormal returns 
 
The average abnormal returns are shown in Tables 4, 5 and   6. 
 
5.1.1 Winning countries 
 
Aggregate market reaction Table 4 shows the abnormal returns at and around the 
moment the nomination information was released, for each type of event. The table 
shows the abnormal returns controlling for worldwide market effects that we assume 
to be unaffected by that particular country specific event. We  present  market-model 
and mean-adjusted CARs and significance tests for four windows of interest: [−1,1], 
[0,0], [0,1] and  [0,5].
28
 
We observe no significant stock price reaction at the announcement dates. This is 
true for all the events we analyze except for a positive reaction at the announcement 
of Specialized Exhibitions: the sign test shows that eight out the ten countries in 
sample showed a positive abnormal return. Overall the magnitude of the observed 
market reaction is economically and statistically insignificant. 
The magnitude and significance of the CARs for the other windows analyzed is not 
significantly  from  zero  with  two  exceptions:  market-model  CARs register  a positive 
significant effect for the Specialized Exhibitions over the window periods [0,1] and [0,5]; 
and there is a negative significant CAR [−1,1] for the European Capitals of Culture. In 
both cases the results are barely significant and only if we use non-parametric tests. 
The evidence does not suggest a differential market reaction for sport or cultural 
events. 
 
Individual markets reaction As noted above, we expect that the impact varies across 
events and markets reflecting several factors such as the importance of the event relative 
to the underlying economy or the degree of partial anticipation. The results in Table 4 
could thus reflect that there is considerable variation across individual markets. We 
observe that some markets experience positive returns while others experience 
negative returns but in most cases these are not statistically or economically 
significant.
29 
The negative reactions are consistent with myopic investors that penalize 
long-term investments. Alternatively one could argue that the market perceives these 
(in most cases public) investments as economy-wide damaging projects. 
Thus, regarding our first hypothesis, we cannot reject the null of no significant 
average aggregate market reaction to the announcements of hosting country 
nominations. The individual market analysis suggests that some markets react 
positively to the announcement of mega-events while others react negatively. Yet, 
overall, the effect is trivial and, on average, not significantly different from zero. The 
results hold across different event categories. The findings seem to be fairly  robust: 
 
 
 
28 We looked upon other significance parametric and non parametric tests. Results are not shown in a table 
to save space. The significance of the results discussed in the paper is barely   unchanged. 
29  There are some exceptions. For example, Greece experienced statistically positive abnormal of returns 
(+7.8%) regarding the announcement of the nomination to host the 2004 Olympic  Games. 
  
 
 
 
Table 4 Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning countries 
Market Model Constant-Mean Model 
[−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] [−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] 
 
 
Panel A. Summer Olympic Games (6 countries) 
 
CARs (%) 0.6869 −0.0802 0.7956 −1.1199 0.3492 −0.2030 0.4678 −2.0425 
θ1 (0.477) (−0.167) (0.828) (−0.389) (0.232) (−0.405) (0.466) (−0.678) 
θ2 (0.465) (−0.163) (0.808) (−0.379) (0.228) (−0.397) (0.458) (−0.666) 
# Positive 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 
τ1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (−0.816) (0.000) (−0.816) (−0.816) 
Panel B. Winter Olympic Games (8 countries) 
CARs (%) −0.1475 −0.2688 −0.2315 0.1392 −0.6561 −0.4788 −0.8302 0.0401 
θ1 (−0.163) (−0.894) (−0.385) (0.077) (−0.573) (−1.255) (−1.088) (0.018) 
θ2 (−0.150) (−0.821) (−0.353) (0.071) (−0.598) (−1.310) (−1.136) (0.018) 
# Positive 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 
τ1 (0.000) (−1.414) (−0.707) (−0.707) (0.000) (−0.707) (−0.707) (−0.707) 
Panel C. World Football Cups (6  countries) 
CARs (%) −0.2937 −0.0248 −0.2027 −0.8063 −0.3328 −0.1635 −0.0706 −0.7306 
θ1 (−0.239) (−0.060) (−0.247) (−0.328) (−0.243) (−0.358) (−0.077) (−0.267) 
θ2 (−0.237) (−0.060) (−0.245) (−0.325) (−0.227) (−0.335) (−0.072) (−0.249) 
# Positive 3 3 2 2 3 2 4 2 
τ1 (0.000) (0.000) (−0.816) (−0.816) (0.000) (−0.816) (0.816) (−0.816) 
Panel D. European Football Cups (10 countries) 
CARs (%) 0.3847 −0.2258 0.1807 0.3968 0.2104 −0.1793 −0.0356 0.3472 
θ1 (0.457) (−0.804) (0.322) (0.236) (0.213) (−0.544) (−0.054) (0.176) 
θ2 (0.396) (−0.697) (0.279) (0.204) (0.190) (−0.485) (−0.048) (0.156) 
# Positive 7 4 7 5 5 4 4 6 
τ1 (1.265) (−0.632) (1.265) (0.000) (0.000) (−0.632) (−0.632) (0.632) 
Panel E. World Exhibitions (11  countries) 
CAR (%) −0.6108 −0.2423 −0.4596 −0.3447 −0.4180 −0.1325 −0.3484 −0.4618 
θ1 (−0.683) (−0.812) (−0.771) (−0.193) (−0.439) (−0.417) (−0.548) (−0.242) 
θ2 (−0.689) (−0.820) (−0.778) (−0.195) (−0.460) (−0.438) (−0.575) (−0.254) 
# Positive 3 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 
τ1 (−1.508) (−1.508) (−0.905) (−0.905) (−0.302) (−0.905) (−0.302) (−0.905) 
Panel F.  Specialized Exhibitions (10 countries) 
CARs (%) 0.4678 0.2475 0.6002 0.2300 0.2591 0.2147 0.5925 −0.1793 
θ1 (0.589) (0.935) (1.134) (0.145) (0.307) (0.762) (1.052) (−0.106) 
θ2 (0.658) (1.045) (1.267) (0.162) (0.351) (0.872) (1.203) (−0.121) 
# Positive 7 7 8 8 6 8 7 7 
τ1 (1.265) (1.265) (1.897)* (1.897)* (0.632) (1.897)* (1.265) (1.265) 
  
     
 
Table 4 (continued) 
    
Market Model    Constant-Mean Model 
[−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5]  [−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] 
Panel G. European Capitals of Culture (30 countries) 
 
CARs (%) 
θ1 
−0.6067 
(−1.114) 
−0.1695 
(−0.933) 
−0.1401 
(−0.386) 
−0.4299 
(−0.395) 
−0.9455 
(−1.607) 
−0.1988 
(−1.013) 
−0.1968 
(−0.502) 
−0.5455 
(−0.463) 
θ2 (−0.838) (−0.702) (−0.290) (−0.297) (−1.106) (−0.698) (−0.345) (−0.319) 
# Positive 11 14 16 14 10 14 15 13 
τ1 (−1.461) (−0.365) (0.365) (−0.365) (−1.826)* (−0.365) (0.000) (−0.730) 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) at the announcement date and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CARs) for several other event windows around the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing market 
index returns on the world market index over the period [−120, −20] in event time. θ1  and θ2  are the 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and with crude dependence adjustment. τ 1 is the 
z-statistic for the sign test. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
 
abnormal performance remains economically and statistically insignificant at and 
around the announcement date regardless of the model we use to compute abnormal 
returns or the chosen parametric or non parametric test we use to assess significance. 
This non-significant average impact is consistent with perfect foresight or trivial 
perceived economic effects for listed firms. Yet the results of the individual market 
analysis show that the impact is country-varying and, for some markets (or  events), 
the effects are positive and even statistically significant. 
 
Individual industries reaction We also evaluate the price impact of the announce- 
ment at an industry-level. We compute industry CARs for 32 individual industries. 
For each industry we compute the cumulative cross-market average abnormal return. 
Our primary interest is to examine whether those industries that were a priori 
identified as directly gaining from the organization of the event, did observe more 
positive significant abnormal returns. Table 5 shows the announcement date AARs 
and the announcement date to next-day CARs for seven industries: Beverages, 
Construction, Leisure and Tourism, Media, Retail, Communications and Transpor- 
tation.
30 
The last row of each panel shows the grand mean (across all industries). 
Panels A to G contain the results for each event   category. 
Overall the results are similar to those in Table 4: the effect is economically and 
statistically insignificant.
31 
As highlighted above, there seems to be a positive effect 
associated with the announcements of Specialized Exhibitions (+0.5%).    Addition- 
ally, the Winter Olympic Games show now a negative effect (−1.0%). These  results 
are statistically significant for the constant-mean residuals. When we examine 
individual industry abnormal returns, we fail to find consistent positive returns    for 
 
 
30  Results for the other industries are not reported here to save   space. 
31 The aggregate values shown at the bottom of Table 5 are equally-weighted averages of industry indices. 
The comparison of these equally-weighted values with the value-weighted averages reported in Table 4, 
show that market weights do not drive the  results. 
  
 
 
 
Table 5  Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning countries 
 
 
Market Model Constant-Mean Model 
 
 [0,0] [0,1]  [0,0] [0,1] 
Panel A. Summer Olympic Games      
Beverages (#5) 0.254 1.244  0.422 2.686 
 (0.263) (0.643)  (0.394) (1.254) 
Construction (#6) 0.098 0.118  0.074 1.192 
 (0.154) (0.092)  (0.474) (3.815)*** 
Leisure and Tourism (#4) 0.377 0.146  0.112 −0.487 
 (0.819) (0.159)  (0.191) (−0.416) 
Media (#5) 0.217 0.484  0.083 1.521 
 (0.323) (0.360)  (0.107) (0.980) 
Retail (#3) −0.08 −0.295  −0.338 −0.692 
 (−0.185) (−0.341)  (−0.457) (−0.467) 
Communications (#4) 0.155 1.351  0.082 1.542 
 (0.397) (1.727)*  (0.127) (1.199) 
Transportation (#5) 0.302 0.304  0.009 1.093 
 (0.544) (0.275)  (0.012) (0.722) 
Global Average 0.0485 0.1028  −0.1959 0.1117 
 (0.398) (0.421)  (−1.307) (0.373) 
Panel B. Winter Olympic Games      
Beverages (#6) −0.009 0.409  −0.689 −0.797 
 (−0.019) (0.439)  (−1.105) (−0.639) 
Construction (#8) −0.633 0.895  −0.852 0.270 
 (−1.284) (0.908)  (−1.491) (0.236) 
Leisure and Tourism (#5) 0.022 −0.310  −0.746 −1.948 
 (0.033) (−0.230)  (−0.911) (−1.189) 
Media (#7) −1.144 −0.580  −1.741 −1.764 
 (−2.410)** (−0.612)  (−2.870)*** (−1.454) 
Retail (#7) 0.733 0.703  0.161 −0.397 
 (1.642) (0.788)  (0.279) (−0.344) 
Communications (#6) −0.471 −0.395  −0.643 −1.344 
 (−1.147) (−0.481)  (−1.113) (−1.164) 
Transportation (#7) 0.127 −0.103  −0.215 −0.360 
 (−1.147) (0.367)  (−0.370) (−0.309) 
Global Average 0.0634 0.0037  −0.4394 −1.0037 
 (0.631) (0.018)  (−3.710)*** (−4.230)*** 
Panel C. World Football Cups      
Beverages (#5) −1.216 −0.272  −1.181 −0.070 
 (−1.520) (−0.170)  (−1.371) (−0.040) 
Construction (#6) −0.475 −0.401  −0.588 −0.427 
 (−1.309) (−0.553)  (−1.172) (−0.425) 
Leisure and Tourism (#5) 0.778 0.877  0.529 1.036 
 (0.777) (0.438)  (0.444) (0.436) 
Media (#4) −0.111 −0.479  −0.099 −0.208 
 (−0.183) (−0.397)  (−0.129) (−0.135) 
Retail (#5) 0.909 1.626  0.717 1.364 
  
     
 
Table 5 (continued) 
    
 Market Model   Constant-Mean Model 
 [0,0] [0,1]  [0,0] [0,1] 
 (1.676)* (1.497)  (1.017) (0.967) 
Communications (#5) 0.810 1.110  0.678 1.349 
 (1.344) (0.920)  (0.710) (0.707) 
Transportation (#6) 0.637 −0.370  0.573 −0.395 
 (1.156) (−0.336)  (0.908) (−0.313) 
Global Average −0.0549 −0.1528  −0.1099 −0.0309 
 (−0.459) (−0.638)  (−0.755) (−0.106) 
Panel D. European Football Cups     
Beverages (#5) 0.491 0.061  0.314 0.038 
 (1.019) (0.064)  (0.602) (0.037) 
Construction (#6) 0.156 0.298  0.177 0.448 
 (0.525) (0.503)  (0.441) (0.558) 
Leisure and Tourism (#5) 0.464 1.197  0.377 1.258 
 (0.486) (0.627)  (0.369) (0.616) 
Media (#4) 0.097 0.356  −0.168 0.216 
 (0.176) (0.322)  (−0.280) (0.180) 
Retail (#5) −0.175 −0.262  −0.346 −0.161 
 (−0.392) (−0.294)  (−0.654) (−0.152) 
Communications (#5) −0.496 −0.470  −0.717 −0.565 
 (−1.163) (−0.551)  (−1.393) (−.549) 
Transportation (#6) −1.586 −1.388  −2.056 −1.557 
 (−1.970)* (−0.862)  (−2.370)** (−0.897) 
Global Average 0.0278 0.1668  −0.1395 0.2767 
 (0.221) (0.663)  (−0.912) (0.905) 
Panel E. World Exhibitions     
Beverages (#10) −0.327 −0.400  −0.191 −0.429 
 (−0.618) (−0.378)  (−0.344) (−0.376) 
Construction (#11) 0.091 0.017  0.018 −0.296 
 (0.276) (0.026)  (0.043) (−0.348) 
Leisure and Tourism (#6) 0.449 0.370  0.658 0.396 
 (0.841) (0.346)  (1.094) (0.329) 
Media (#8) 0.607 1.312  0.867 1.411 
 (1.307) (1.412)  (1.638) (1.333) 
Retail (#8) 0.060 0.070  −0.039 −0.099 
 (0.177) (0.103)  (−0.088) (−0.113) 
Communications (#7) 0.709 0.641  0.733 0.748 
 (1.739)* (0.785)  (1.467) (0.749) 
Transportation (#9) 0.194 0.704  0.099 0.215 
 (0.512) (0.931)  (0.203) (0.221) 
Global Average 0.1345 0.0623  0.1911 0.0177 
 (1.633) (0.378)  (1.923) (0.089) 
Panel F.  Specialized Exhibitions     
Beverages (#9) 0.516 0.665  0.749 1.037 
 (0.969) (0.624)  (1.231) (0.853) 
  
      
 
Table 5 (continued) 
     
 Market Model   Constant-Mean Model 
 [0,0] [0,1]  [0,0] [0,1] 
Construction (#10) 0.058 0.313  0.155 0.797 
 (0.176) (0.472)  (0.397) (1.023) 
Leisure and Tourism (#3) −0.628 0.385  −0.691 1.872 
 (−0.713) (0.218)  (−0.623) (0.844) 
Media (#7) −0.052 −0.567  0.049 −0.437 
 (−0.133) (−0.730)  (0.113) (−0.510) 
Retail (#9) −0.509 −0.843  −0.401 −0.420 
 (−1.316) (−1.090)  (−0.928) (−0.486) 
Communications (#7) −0.106 −0.793  0.098 −0.188 
 (−0.267) (−1.004)  (0.204) (−0.196) 
Transportation (#10) −0.228 0.626  −0.041 1.193 
 (−0.531) (0.730)  (−0.081) (1.178) 
Global Average −0.1302 0.0539  −0.1054 0.4711 
 (−1.217) (0.252)  (−0.833) (1.862)* 
Panel G. European Capitals of Culture 
Beverages (#24) −0.069 0.337  −0.173 0.203 
 (−0.200) (0.485)  (−0.435) (0.255) 
Construction (#30) −0.046 0.263  −0.257 0.019 
 (−0.229) (0.660)  (−0.989) (0.036) 
Leisure and Tourism (#15) −0.312 −0.168  −0.328 −0.191 
 (−0.834) (−0.224)  (−0.746) (−0.217) 
Media (#22) 0.615 0.754  0.541 0.643 
 (1.830) (1.121)  (1.505) (0.894) 
Retail (#22) −0.291 0.077  −0.259 −0.259 
 (−1.008) (0.133)  (−0.785) (−0.785) 
Communications (#18) 0.016 0.347  −0.139 0.200 
 (0.055) (0.577)  (−0.340) (0.244) 
Transportation (#25) 0.322 0.388  0.272 0.334 
 (0.972) (0.586)  (0.739) (0.454) 
Global Average 0.0578 0.1666  −0.0327 0.1061 
 (0.763) (1.099)  (−0.358) (0.581) 
This table reports industry average abnormal returns (AAR) at the announcement date, and day of the 
announcement and next day cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs). # denotes the number of 
markets used to compute the industry average abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are constant-mean and 
risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing market index returns on the world 
market index over the period [−120, −20] in event time. The table shows the abnormal returns for the 
industries that a priori would benefit more from the event. The last row shows the global average AR and 
CAR across all industries (up to 32). In parentheses we report Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test 
statistics, without crude dependence adjustment. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
   
 
 
 
Table 6 Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: losing countries 
Market Model Constant-Mean Model 
[−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] [−1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] 
 
 
Panel A. Summer Olympic Games (5 countries) 
 
CARs (%) −1.1602 −0.0967 −1.0230 0.5208 2.2832 0.9738 0.1149 −2.4676 
θ1 (−0.785) (−0.196) (−1.039) (0.176) (0.996) (1.274) (0.075) (−0.538) 
θ1 (−0.570) (−0.143) (−0.754) (0.128) (0.978) (1.251) 0.074) (−0.529) 
# Positive 2 3 2 3 4 4 2 3 
τ1 (−0.447) (0.447) (−0.447) (0.447 (1.342 (1.342) (−0.447 (0.447) 
Panel B. Winter Olympic Games (5 countries) 
CARs (%) 0.5074 0.2802 −0.0160 0.5253 0.8870 0.6367 0.2619 0.7717 
θ1 (0.313) (0.518) (−0.015) (0.162) (0.514) (1.106) (0.227) (0.223) 
θ2 (0.321) (0.532) (−0.015) (0.166) (0.518) (1.116) (0.229) (0.225) 
# Positive 2 3 3 1 2 4 4 2 
τ1 (−0.447) (0.447) (0.447) (−1.342) (−0.447) (1.342) (1.342) (−0.447) 
Panel C. World Exhibitions (4 countries) 
CARs (%) 0.4727 0.1898 0.3343 0.9237 0.0798 0.5230 0.0517 0.3347 
θ1 (0.803) (0.968) (0.852) (0.785) (0.046) (0.896) (0.044) (0.096) 
θ2 (0.791) (0.953) (0.839) (0.773) (0.044) (0.866) (0.043) (0.092) 
# Positive 3 3 3 4 2 4 2 3 
τ1 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (2.000)** (0.000) (2.000)** (0.000) (1.000) 
Panel D. World Football Cups (South Africa) (1  country) 
CARs (%)  0.9040    0.4095    0.6283    0.5535    0.1536    −0.073    −0.493 1.4042 
 
 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AAR) at the announcement date and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CARs) for several other event windows around the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing market 
index returns on the world market index over the period [−120, −20] in event time. θ1  and θ2  are the 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and with crude dependence adjustment. τ1 is the 
z-statistic for the sign test. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
 
 
the selected industries and, in most cases, the effects are small and not statistically 
different from zero. 
These results are inconsistent with value-maximization theories because we fail to 
observe a positive significant effect for industries that a priori would benefit most 
from the event. In any case, as above, results could reflect that the effects have 
already been anticipated by investors. 
 
 
5.1.2 Losing countries 
 
If the announcement of the nomination affects negatively the losing country, market 
expectations must have included, prior to the announcement, the likelihood  country 
  
 
 
 
could win and benefit from the organization of the event. When the country loses, 
prices adjust downwards. 
Table 6 shows the aggregate stock market effects for losers. Our sub-sample 
includes only those events for which there was information regarding the losing 
candidates. Because of that, we had to exclude some of the World and all the European 
Football Cups. We also excluded the Specialized Exhibitions and the European 
Capitals of Culture because these were single candidacies-events. Further we excluded 
some losers for which market price information was not available. The final sub- 
sample comprises thus fifteen announcements (five Olympic Summer Games, five 
Olympic Winter Games, one World Football Cup and four World   Exhibitions. 
We do not find a statistical significant negative market reaction as the partial 
anticipation or sentiment arguments would predict. On the contrary, for the specific 
case of the World Exhibitions we even observe a couple of positive   CARs. 
The bulk of the evidence so far is consistent with perfect foresight or trivial economic 
effects. Yet the results of the individual market analysis show a wide variation in price 
reaction. Below, we investigate whether between the variation in impact (across markets 
and events) is systematically related to factors such as partial anticipation. 
 
5.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
5.2.1 Variables 
 
We evaluate the relation between the observed abnormal performance and a set of 
event, market and industry attributes as proposed by the empirical specification in 
(7). Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted returns. Table 10 in “Appendix” 
presents descriptive information for the variables of interest included in the cross- 
sectional analysis. The information refers to a subset (32) of the events for which 
information was available for all variables. These are six Summer Olympic Games, 
eight Winter Olympic Games, one World Football Cup, ten World Exhibitions and 
seven Specialized Exhibitions. 
The average (median) mega-event has an investment of around 1% (0.2%) of the 
host country GNP, is announced 69 (71) months in advance, and gets 56% (39%) 
votes more than the losing country in the last round of voting. When we split the 
sample into groups according to the type of event, we observe that the most 
important type of event are the Summer Olympic Games, that show an average 
(median) relative size of 3.3% (1.7%), followed by the Olympic Winter Games and 
the World Exhibitions that register the same average of 1.1%. The average (median) 
percent of votes received by the winning country in excess of the other final 
candidate, just before the outcome of the bidding process is revealed, is 56% (39%). 
The result suggests that the outcome of these biddings is largely anticipated. In fact, 
this is the case for the Specialized Exhibitions for which, in all cases, there was only 
a single candidacy. As for the World Exhibitions, only the four more recent ones 
were competitive biddings. This is not the case for other events for which the 
bidding process is rather competitive like the Olympic Games and the Football Cups. 
The information regarding the voting rounds is only publicly available for the 
Olympic Games, the World Exhibitions and, very recently, for the World Football 
Cups. The Olympic Games seem to be the most highly competitive biddings: the 
   
 
 
 
average (median) difference in votes between the winning and losing countries in the 
last round is respectively 28.8% and 32.7% (20.3% and 27.5%) for the Winter and 
Summer Games with a minimum of 2.3% (2000 Summer Olympic Games in 
Australia). The average (median) difference in votes for the five World Football 
Cups, for which voting results have been made publicly available, is 34.7% (26.3%) 
with a minimum of 4.3% for the 2006 Cup in Germany.
32 
As for the World 
Exhibitions, the average (median) difference in votes is 66.9%  (100%).
33
 
 
5.2.2 GLS estimates 
 
We regress cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) against the set of variables 
described in the previous section. Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients of the 
industry fixed effects regressions for two specifications (with and without the 
variable REP). We use a total of 699/701 pooled industry observations regarding 32 
events. 
The regressions show an adjusted R-square of 19% and estimates are similar for 
the two specifications. We find statistically significant coefficients for the 
independent variables LAG, VOT and REP as well as for  the  two  dummies 
D_WOG and D_WE. 
The coefficient associated with the variable VOT is very significant (at 1% level) 
and is consistent with investors partially anticipating the outcome of the bidding 
process. The more competitive the voting process (i.e., the smaller the difference in 
votes between the winning and the losing candidates), the larger the surprise and the 
greater the market impact. For a decline of 10% in the difference between the 
percentage of votes for winning and losing bidders, the CARs increases   0.23%. 
As for the variable LAG, the coefficient is economically and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the investors’ myopia hypothesis, the 
reaction to the announcement is smaller the larger the lag between the announcement 
and the realization of the event. For each further month, the CARs declines by 
0.01%. 
The coefficient of the control variable REP is significant at a 5% level. This 
positive relation between industry market weight and price impact could reflect 
awareness. If the industry is well-represented, investors will be more inclined to 
believe that mega-event news will affect the companies belonging to that  industry. 
 
5.3 Partial anticipation 
 
5.3.1 Partial anticipation I 
 
To evaluate the role of partial anticipation we test the model specification in (8). We 
pool the CARs for winners and losers. Our sample comprises 39 observations (24 
winners and 15 losers). 
 
 
 
32 This was a very tight victory: Germany secured 12 out of the 23 votes against the 12 received by South 
Africa (the other candidate in the final round). 
33  The minimum was 2.4% for the 2000 World Exhibition: Germany secured 21 out the 41 votes   against 
the 20 received by Canada. 
  
 
 
 
Table 7 Cross-sectional regressions 
 
 
Independent variables Coefficients of industry fixed effects regression models 
 
 
(1) (2) 
SIZE −0.0008 0.0230 
(−0.016) (0.475) 
LAG  −0.0001***  
−0.0001*** (−2.833) (−2.795) 
LIQ −0.0058 −0.0052 
(0.209) (−0.190) 
REC 0.0033 0.0035 
(0.944) (1.003) 
EXP −0.0024 −0.0022 
(−1.339) (−1.266) 
REP 0.0373** 
(2.082) 
VOT   −0.02320*** −0.0235*** 
(−7.956) (−8.108) 
D_SOG −0.0006 −0.0009 
(−0.132) (−0.198) 
D_WOG  −0.0134***  
−0.0135*** (−3.138) (−3.161) 
D_WFC 0.0069 0.0068 
(1.465) (1.440) 
D_WE 0.0109** 0.0115** 
(2.124) (2.228) 
# obs./ # events 699/32 701/32 
Adj. R2  19.1%  18.8% 
 
 
This table reports GLS regressions estimates with host country industry cumulative abnormal returns 
CARs[0,1] as the dependent variable. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. SIZE is the ratio 
between the event capital expenditure and the host country GDP; LAG is the time lag between the 
announcement and the moment of the event; LIQ is the ratio between of the country market capitalization 
and GDP; REC is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at the time of the event and 0 
otherwise; EXP is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in expansion at the time of the event and 0 
otherwise; REP is the weight of the industry market capitalization in aggregate market capitalization; VOT 
is the difference in the percentage of votes between the winning and the losing country with the largest 
number of votes in the last round. D_SOG, D_WOG, D_WFC, D_WE and D_EE are the dummies for the 
type of event (Summer Olympic Games, Winter Olympic Games, World Exhibitions and World 
Specialized Exhibitions). The last two rows report, respectively, the number of observations and the 
adjusted R2 . Industry fixed effects coefficients are not reported. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
CARjs  ¼ b0 þ b1 SIZEj þ b2 LAGj þ b3 LIQjs þ b4 RECj þ b5 EXPj þ þb6 REPjs þ b7 VOTj þ 
P 
g Dk þ 
k    k 
hjs . j stands for country. s stands for industry. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
   
 
 
 
Panel A of Table 8 gives the results.
34 
The parameter associated with the prior 
probability of winning is negative (but not statistically significant). As for the 
parameter associated with the dummy for the nomination, we observed a positive 
and statistically significant estimate. The fit of the regression is poor but the 
evidence suggests that the effects are consistent with the predictions of the model 
proposed in the  “Appendix”: 
– losers register, on average, a negative price effect and the magnitude of the 
effect is associated with their priors of winning, and 
– winners register, on average, positive price impacts; the magnitude of the effect 
is positively (negatively) related with the degree of surprise (anticipation) in the 
nomination news. 
 
 
5.3.2 Partial anticipation II 
 
We now turn to the alternative specification model of partial anticipation in (13). 
This specification uses a more refined proxy of the degree of surprise (anticipation) 
in the announcement news, using the information in all the successive rounds of 
voting. 
The regression results are shown in Table 9. As for the previous model we 
estimate the model with unbalanced and balanced samples (panels A and B, 
respectively). To evaluate the effects for the winning and losing countries we 
perform a series of linear tests of the estimated  parameters. 
The fit of the model is good and similar for the unbalanced and balanced samples 
(adjusted R-square of 46% and 60%, respectively). We comment upon Panel A 
given that both panels show very similar  results. 
Overall the estimated parameters are in line with the predictions. We observe that: 
– (1) when the outcome of the bidding process contains little or no news (in other 
words, there is partial or no surprise) there is no significant market reaction  for 
the losers: Intercept + PS (−0.32%) and Intercept (0.54%) are not    statistically 
significant. For the winning countries, the effect is negative if there is no 
(Intercept + D = −0.68%) or only partial surprise (Intercept + PS + D + D*PS = 
−0.89%) but not statistically significant at the 5%  level. 
– (2) when the outcome of the bidding process is a total surprise, the market 
reaction is negative and statistically significant for losers (Intercept + TS = 
−3.31%). For the nominated countries we observe a very significant positive 
reaction (Intercept + TS + D + D*TS = +4.96%) Further, we reject the null that 
the effects are the same for partial or total  surprises. 
Summarizing, when we control for prior expectations, the announcement of 
mega-events is associated with a positive market reaction in the nominated  country 
 
 
 
 
34 We also run the regression with a balanced sample, including only those events for which we had 
information regarding the winning and the losing bidders (14 events, 28 observations -14 winners and 14 
losers). The results are inconclusive. 
  
 
 
 
Table 8 Partial anticipation model I—estimated parameters 
 
 Estimate t-value 
Panel A. Unbalanced panel   
Intercept 0.8598 (0.768) 
p −3.8013 (−1.608) 
D 1.5138 (1.810)** 
# (winning/losing) 39 (24/15)  
Adj. R2 4.1%  
 Null Hypothesis p−value (Wald test)  
|α|=|δ| (0.580)  
Panel B. Balanced panel   
Intercept −0.9437 (−0.249) 
p 0.4791 (0.055) 
D 1.0229 (0.684) 
# (winning/losing) #28 (14/14)  
Adj. R2 0.0%  
 Null Hypothesis p-value (Wald test)  
|α|=|δ| (0.987)  
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-day CARs 
[0,1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. p is defined as the 
probability of country hosting the event and is given by the percentage of votes received by the country in 
the last round of voting; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is nominated and 0 otherwise. 
The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R2 . The last row shows the p-values 
for  linear  tests  of  significance  for  the  parameters.  Estimates  are  multiplied  by  100. 
CARi ¼ a þ fpi þ dDi þ mi . 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
 
and a negative reaction in the losing country. The greater the surprise, the greater the 
positive (negative) impact of the nomination news for the winning (losing)  country. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper tests whether the selection of countries to host international sporting and 
cultural events is associated with significant stock market reaction in the winning 
and losing countries. Using a cross-section of 81 events, we find that on average 
there is no significant market impact in either the winning and losing countries. 
Further, the stock prices of companies in industries more likely to extract direct 
benefits from the organization of the event do not change significantly upon the 
announcement. Given that some selections are anticipated, the market reaction 
around the announcement date does not seem to accurately proxy the perceived 
economic impact of these events. In fact, when we control for the prior expectations 
upon the outcome of the voting, the announcement of mega-events is associated with 
a positive market reaction in the nominated country and a negative reaction in the 
losing country. Overall we interpret our findings as supportive of rational   valuation 
   
 
 
 
Table 9 Partial anticipation model II—estimated parameters 
 
 
Estimate t-value 
 
 
Panel A. Unbalanced panel 
Intercept 0.5374 (0.636) 
PS −0.8564 (−0.877) 
TS −3.8508 (−3.220)*** 
D −1.2201 (−1.324) 
D*PS 1.0137 (0.823) 
D*TS 8.2827 (5.487)*** 
# (winning/losing) 39 (24/15) 
Adj. R2 46.3% 
 Null Hypothesis p-value (Wald test) 
Intercept + PS = 0 (0.513) 
Intercept + TS = 0 (0.000)*** 
Intercept + PS = Intercept + TS (0.002)** 
Intercept + D = 0 (0.062)* 
Intercept + PS + D + D*PS =  0 (0.422) 
Intercept + TS + D + D*TS =  0 (0.000)*** 
Intercept + PS + D + D*PS = Intercept + TS + D +   D*TS (0.000)*** 
|Intercept| = |Intercept + D| (0.185) 
Panel B. Balanced panel 
Intercept 0.5375 (0.685) 
PS −0.7889 (−0.857) 
TS −3.8508 (−3.468)*** 
D −1.1494 (−1.248) 
D*PS 1.4165 (1.141) 
D*TS 9.3502 (6.050)*** 
# (winning/losing) 28 (14/14) 
Adj. R2 60.0% 
 Null Hypothesis p-value (Wald test) 
Intercept + PS = 0 (0.601) 
Intercept + TS = 0 (0.000)*** 
Intercept + PS = Intercept + TS (0.001)*** 
Intercept + D = 0 (0.203) 
Intercept + PS + D + D*PS =  0 (0.982) 
Intercept + TS + D + D*TS =  0 (0.000)*** 
Intercept + PS + D + D*PS = Intercept + TS + D +   D*TS (0.000)*** 
|Intercept| = |Intercept + D| (0.212) 
 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-day CARs 
[0.1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. PS is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial surprise and 0 otherwise; TS is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are an almost total surprise and 0 otherwise; and D is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is nominated and 0 otherwise. The table also reports the 
number of observations and the adjusted R2 . The last rows show the p-values for several tests of 
significance for the sum of parameters. Estimates are multiplied by 100. CARi  ¼ f0  þ f1  PSi  þ f2  TSi  þ 
l0 Di  þ l1  Di PSi  þ l2  DiTSi  þ wi. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral   tests. 
  
 
 
 
and partial anticipation: when the announcement news are total surprises, market 
reaction is statistically significant, positive for winners and negative for losers, 
reflecting that investors believe that selections to host mega-events are positive 
news. 
The market reaction we observe seems to reflect only a part of the overall 
perceived economic benefit of these mega-events. It is thus not correct to extrapolate 
these results to judge the economic merit of hosting these mega-events. The 
evidence suggests further that the economic benefits of hosting these mega-events 
vary across markets and events. The main finding of our study is that part of the 
variation in market reaction is associated with the degree of anticipation of the 
outcome of the bidding process. Further work is required to establish the other 
determinants of the observed cross-sectional variation in market reaction. 
 
 
 
Table 10 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
Panel A. All events (#32)     
SIZE 0.0124 0.0017 0.0000 0.1056 0.0245 
LAG 68.7 70.5 13 120 23.1 
VOT 56.3% 38.7% 2.3% 100.0% 42.1% 
Panel B. Summer Olympic Games (#6) 
SIZE 0.0326 0.0170 0.0005 0.1056 0.0021 
LAG 77.5 78.5 69.0 85.0 7.3 
VOT 32.7% 27.5% 2.3% 88.2% 29.3% 
Panel C. Winter Olympic Games (#8) 
SIZE 0.0110 0.0024 0.0001 0.0725 0.0022 
LAG 69.1 70.5 64.0 77.0 4.5 
VOT 28.8% 20.3% 2.8% 100.0% 32.1% 
Panel D. World Football Cups  (#5)* 
VOT 34.7% 26.3% 4.3% 100.0% 39.1% 
Panel E. World Exhibitions (#10) 
 
SIZE (#1) 0.0102 0.0014 0.0000 0.0475 0.0023 
LAG (#1) 76.2 69.0 38.0 124.0 29.6 
VOT (#6) 66.9% 100.0% 2.5% 100.0% 43.4% 
Panel F.  Specialized Exhibitions (#7) 
SIZE 0.0010 0.0003 0.0000 0.0057 0.0021 
LAG 49.3 47.0 13.0 88.0 27.7 
VOT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the events. SIZE is the ratio between the event capital expenditure 
and the host country GDP; LAG is the time lag between the announcement and the moment of the event 
(number of months); VOT is the difference in the percentage of votes between the winning and the losing 
country with the largest number of votes in the last round. # denotes the number of events used to 
computed the cross-sectional statistics. 
*Only 1 included in the cross-sectional regressions and used to compute the statistics in Panel   A. 
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Appendix 
 
A model of market impact of partially anticipated  events 
 
This appendix presents a simple model of partial anticipation that generates a set of 
hypotheses tested in our study. The model is built upon the models proposed by 
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) and Edmans et al.  (2007). 
We assume that investors partially anticipate the likelihood that a particular 
country hosts one or several international sporting or cultural events. Let’s denote pi 
as the probability of country i hosting the event. Before the nominated host country 
is announced, the anticipated economic impact of the event is already reflected in the 
market valuations of the bidding countries. The economic impact of a particular 
event (its net present value) for candidate country listed firms is denoted by NPV. If 
country j is chosen to host the contest (the winning country), the (positive) market 
price effect at the date of announcement is given by (1−pj) x NPVj. The observed 
market reaction is thus a biased estimate of the true economic effect and is inversely 
related to the prior probability of winning. As for the market impact of the candidate 
countries whose bids were rejected (the loser countries), we should observe a 
negative market effect following the announcement, and, in absolute terms, 
positively related with the prior probability of winning. If we focus on the two 
countries  in  the  last  round  of  the  voting  process,  when  the  final  outcome    is 
announced, the market price effect for the losing country l is given by −pl  NPVl  that 
equals −(1−pj)NPVl. 
The potential benefits brought by the organization event are expected to be 
different from country to country (NPV varies across bidding candidates) and 
consequently the absolute magnitude of the stock market effects to winners and 
losers can differ substantially. Therefore, a priori, asymmetric effects are expected 
for the winning and losing countries. 
In assessing the probability of winning (losing), investors may consider the 
degree of competitiveness of the contest, whether the country is considered to be a 
front runner in advance and the initial rounds of the voting (that are publicized 
before the final outcome is realized). Our empirical model in Section 4 accom- 
modates some of these features. 
At the time of the announcement, two possible outcomes may result. Either the 
country wins the organization of the event or loses. Let’s denote VW as the market 
valuation of a particular country at time 0 if it hosts the event and VL its market 
valuation otherwise. Market valuation just before the event is announced (t=−1) for 
a candidate country is thus given  by: 
    
 
   
 
 
 
Given that 
 
 
 
(A-1) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Abnormal returns at the date of the announcement can be computed   as: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and E(Ri) is the company’s expected return for a given return generating process. 
For the winning country j, V0j  = VWj, and abnormal returns are thus given    by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that can be rewritten as 
 
 
    
 
- 1¼ 1 þ 
VLj þpj NPVj  
- 1¼  
  
 
For the losing country l, V0l  = VLl, and abnormal returns are given   by: 
 
 
 
that can be rewritten as 
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